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The goal of this paper is to suggest a somewhat different approach to the contemporary discussion of human sexual orientations. Instead of examining 
the nature of sexual orientation itself, it discusses the meanings of ascriptions of sexual orientation. (The discussion is confined to cases where the 
subject of ascription is female.) The paper begins with a survey of some prevalent ways of interpreting ascriptions of sexual orientation. It then 
comments on the variations in their meanings, and considers what the speaker is doing when uttering such an ascription. It concludes with some 
comments about an apparently anomalous sexual orientation, bisexuality. 
M y interest i n the ascription of sexual orientations 
arose, i n part, f rom three observations w h i c h I made over 
the course of the past year. 1 First, i n my investigations of 
ethical issues perta ining to reproductive technology, it 
became very clear that access to such processes as in vitro 
fert i l ization and art i f ic ial inseminat ion by donor is regu-
lated and l imi ted by means of the physician-enforced stip-
u la t ion that the female candidates for these technologies 
must be heterosexual. Elsewhere I have documented and 
evaluated the arguments w h i c h have been offered o n 
behalf of these st ipulat ions . 2 What also interested me, 
however, were questions about what it is to be heterosex-
u a l , and how one is to know whether any person ( includ-
i n g oneself) is heterosexual. 
M y second observation occurred at a conference o n 
w o m e n and sexuality i n the fal l of 1985. Felicitously 
entitled " C o m i n g Together , " the conference offered var-
ious workshops designated as being for heterosexual 
women, for lesbian women, and for bisexual women. 
Undaunted by the labels, I attended workshops of a l l three 
kinds; it was not clear to me just h o w one was to k n o w 
where one belonged. In some respects the most interesting 
of the three was a workshop for bisexual women, entitled 
" B i s e x u a l W o m e n : D o We Real ly Exis t?" . O n encounter-
i n g this apparently existential doubt, I was inc l ined to ask 
myself what it is to be bisexual, and how one is to k n o w 
whether any person ( inc luding oneself) is bisexual. 
F i n a l l y , my third observation occurred after meeting a 
physic ian w h o is also an abort ion rights activist and a 
feminist therapist. When I mentioned to a mutua l friend 
that I had met this w o m a n , the friend informed me that the 
w o m a n is, or identifies herself as, a lesbian bisexual. O n 
hear ing this apparently bifocal identif ication I wondered 
what it is to be a lesbian (let alone a lesbian bisexual), and 
h o w one is to know whether any person ( inc luding one-
self) is one. 
I was troubled, then, by both ontological and epistemo-
logical problems: What is it to be lesbian or heterosexual 
or bisexual? H o w does one know whether a person is 
lesbian or heterosexual or bisexual? Part of the difficulty 
w h i c h I faced w i t h these questions arose from the fact that 
most other people d id not seem to see them as problems. 3 
Certainly those w h o are w i l l i n g to discriminate against 
certain women on the grounds that they are not hetero-
sexual appear to f i n d no diff iculty i n ascribing heterosex-
ual i ty to some women and not to others. S imi lar ly , the 
women at the sexuality conference, most of w h o m identi-
fied themselves as feminists, apparently had no dif f iculty 
i n ascribing a sexual orientation to themselves, and some-
times to other women as wel l . 
After a great deal of thought, I was sti l l unable to arrive 
at definitive answers to the ontological and epistemologi-
cal questions. I now belive that it is a mistake to attempt to 
answer these questions without first responding to a more 
fundamental one: the question of meaning. T h e more 
basic question is conceptual i n nature: what is meant, or 
what might be meant, by saying that an i n d i v i d u a l is (or is 
really, no matter how she might appear) heterosexual, 
lesbian, or bisexual? 4 
T h i s is not just a simple matter of def ini t ion. For a l l 
feminists, "the process of n a m i n g and def in ing is not an 
intellectual game, but a grasping of our experience and a 
key to a c t i o n . " 5 Investigation of the meaning of ascrip-
tions of sexual orientation provides an indirect approach 
to understanding the nature of sexual orientations and 
their ethical, po l i t i ca l , and ontological underpinnings. 
Hence, it is important to consider the ways i n w h i c h these 
sexual ascriptions might be interpreted, the contexts i n 
w h i c h they are employed, the emotional baggage they 
carry, and the functions they possess. A d d i t i o n a l l ight can 
be cast u p o n their meaning by considering the sorts of 
things the speaker may be d o i n g when uttering them: such 
things as condemning or commending ; describing or 
hypothesizing or prescribing; and choosing, or fa i l ing or 
refusing to choose, a po l i t i ca l stance or a worldview. In 
addit ion, it is necessary to take account of those contexts 
where ascriptions of sexual orientation are used fre-
quently, where they really seem to matter, as wel l as, just as 
signif icantly, those i n w h i c h they are resisted, and those i n 
w h i c h they are considered inappropriate, or are s imply 
not used—contexts i n w h i c h , for example, a n individual ' s 
being heterosexual appears to "go without saying." 
Hence, i n this paper I discuss the meaning, or more 
accurately the meanings, or families of meanings, of 
ascriptions of sexual orientation. In order to reduce some 
of the complexit ies of the subject, I shall confine the 
discussion to cases where the subject of ascription is 
female. W h i l e I do not assume that there are innate or 
essential differences between sexual orientations i n males 
and sexual orientations i n females, I believe that there are 
important differences under patriarchal capital ism i n the 
ways i n w h i c h sexual orientations are expressed, under-
stood and conceptualized i n w o m e n and i n men. T o say 
that a w o m a n is heterosexual is not the same as saying that 
a m a n is heterosexual. A n d , to say that a w o m a n is lesbian 
is not the same as saying that a m a n is homosexual. (As 
Adr ienne R i c h points out, " T o equate lesbian existence 
w i t h male homosexuality.. . is to deny and erase female 
reality once again" 6 . ) A s a feminist I a m committed above 
a l l to understanding women's experience; for these rea-
sons I shall concentrate o n the meanings of ascriptions of 
sexual orientation to women. 
I shal l not, however, attempt to survey a l l of the possible 
or historical meanings and uses of ascriptions of sexual 
orientation. Instead, I want to explore the terrain some-
what informal ly , wi thout attempting to achieve prema-
ture closure on the subject. I shall , therefore, survey some 
current theories about the meanings of ascriptions of sex-
ual orientation, and add some thoughts of my o w n . In the 
end I hope to contribute to ways of interpreting these 
ascriptions w h i c h have some theoretical and empir ica l 
just i f icat ion consistent w i t h a contemporary feminist 
perspective. Most of the discussion w i l l focus on the terms 
"heterosexual" and " l esb ian , " leaving, for reasons that 
w i l l become apparent later, discussion of the term "bisex-
u a l " to the end. 
I 
Heterosexuality for women is not s imply a matter of 
sexual preference, any more than lesbianism is. It is 
a matter of orientation of attention, as is lesbianism, 
i n a metaphysical context control led by neither 
heterosexual nor lesbian w o m e n . 7 
L i k e M a r i l y n Frye and many others, I prefer to use the 
word " o r i e n t a t i o n " rather than "preference." T h e reason 
is that the term "preference" suggests the s imple expres-
sion of a desire or choice, as if heterosexuality, lesbianism, 
and bisexuality were not m u c h more than "lifestyles" 
freely assumed and knowledgeably accepted. 8 Of course 
they might be, or some of them might be, but I do not want 
to begin by assuming that this is the case. A s I shall suggest 
latter, the term "or ientat ion" has advantages of its o w n . 
It is important to dist inguish sexual orientation both 
f rom b io log ica l sex and from gender, that is, mascul ini ty 
and feminini ty . T h i s point might seem obvious to late 
twentieth-century feminists, but it has not always been. In 
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both 
psychologists and the individuals w h o m they studied 
tended to conflate sexual orientation w i t h gender. C o n -
cerning a c o m m u n i t y of lesbian women i n the 1920s, for 
example, Vern B u l l o u g h and Bonnie B u l l o u g h write that 
they "tendfed] to believe that they were different f rom 
other women, and these differences they saw i n terms of 
their qualities of mascu l in i ty . " 9 Because of the conflat ion 
of gender and sexual orientation, a heterosexual w o m a n 
was thought to be a w o m a n w h o assumed the appropriate 
gender role as a feminine woman; a lesbian w o m a n was a 
w o m a n w h o rejected her gender role, and wanted to be a 
male. 
T h i s conflat ion is tied up, historically, w i t h the ten-
dency to equate heterosexual w i t h " n o r m a l , " " n a t u r a l , " 
and "heal thy , " and lesbian w i t h " a b n o r m a l , " " u n n a t u -
r a l , " or " s i c k . " Today it is perpetuated i n scientific studies 
of lesbianism w h i c h s t i l l assume that lesbianism, viewed 
as "deviance" f rom one's gender role, cries out for scien-
tific explanat ion, whereas heterosexuality, being normal , 
does n o t . 1 0 In this context, to say that a w o m a n is lesbian is 
to say, i n part, that she is the v i c t i m of certain causative 
factors (perhaps i n her hormones or her family) ; whereas 
to say that a w o m a n is heterosexual is to deny the occur-
rence of any special sexually-related events i n her personal 
history. 1 1 
Of course, these connotations of sexual ascriptions also 
persist outside of scientific studies. As M a r i l y n Frye 
remarks, 
P o p u l a r images of the lesbian and the gay m a n are 
images of people w h o do not fit the patterns of 
gender imposed o n the sexes. She is seen as a female 
w h o is not feminine and he is a male w h o is not 
mascul ine . 1 2 
These connotations are used to denigrate lesbian women 
and to keep heterosexual w o m e n i n their place . 1 3 T o refer 
to a w o m a n as a lesbian is to negatively evaluate her, 
perhaps to blame her, and to attempt to exert control over 
her, by c a l l i n g u p o n the spurious historical connections 
between sexual orientation and gender, "deviance" f rom 
w h i c h is standardly considered to be inappropriate. O n l y 
persistent feminist cr i t ic ism can help to make it clear that 
sex, gender, and sexual orientation are not inextricably 
l i n k e d ; that gender and sexual orientation may vary inde-
pendently of one another, and that stereotyping by gender 
or by sexual orientation is moral ly opprobr ious . 1 4 
T h e most obvious but rather l imi ted meaning of ascrip-
tions of sexual orientation derives from the sex of the 
person w i t h w h o m one engages i n sexual activity. T h u s , a 
w o m a n w h o is heterosexual engages i n sexual activity 
w i t h men; a w o m a n w h o is lesbian engages i n sexual 
activity w i t h women; and a w o m a n w h o bisexual engages 
i n sexual activity w i t h both w o m e n and men. T h i s is the 
usual approach to def in ing the terms w i t h i n standard 
scientific studies, 1 5 , and it is presumably i n this sense that 
w o m e n seeking access to reproductive technology are 
required to be heterosexual. 
For a number of reasons such an interpretation renders 
elusive the meanings of lesbian and heterosexual. First, 
individuals do not always engage i n sexual activity just 
w i t h members of one sex exclusively, yet there may be 
important reasons (to be discussed later) for describing 
them as heterosexual or lesbian. Moreover, a w o m a n 
might s ignif icant ly be cal led or identify herself as lesbian 
or heterosexual even if she is celibate. T h u s , the meaning 
of the ascription seems not to be entirely dependent u p o n 
the actual occurrence of sexual activity. M i g h t it then be 
dependent at least u p o n an historical fact: h a v i n g (at some 
time or times) engaged i n the appropriate type of sexual 
activity? Apparent ly not, for some w o m e n have identified 
themselves as lesbian or heterosexual l o n g before they 
acted u p o n that identi f icat ion. O n the other hand, some 
women engage i n sexual activity w i t h women (or w i t h 
men) and do not therefore identify themselves as lesbian 
(or as heterosexual); such a relationship may sometimes 
merely be seen as involvement w i t h a particular ind iv idua l 
a n d not as indicat ive of attraction to members of that sex 
i n general . 1 6 It w o u l d be inappropriate to classify an i n d i -
vidual 's sexual orientation o n the basis of her past behav-
i o u r without reference to what she has felt or done since 
then. 
So an ascription of sexual orientation is not necessarily 
a way of referring to a person's sexual behaviour; nor is it 
always a way of referring to the sex of her sexual partners. 
Such an interpretation excludes an important component 
of women's sexuality: our sexual feelings and erotic at-
tachments. In a patriarchal culture, w h o m one has sex w i t h 
is not necessarily an indicat ion of one's sexual desires, and 
a w o m a n who, for example, regularly engages (or must 
engage) i n heterosexual activity may not necessarily feel 
the appropriate attraction to men. 
T h e possibility of this divergence i n some women's lives 
between sexual desire and sexual activity seems to suggest 
that ascriptions of sexual orientation ought realistically to 
be interpreted i n terms of women's o w n erotic feelings and 
attractions. T h a t is, they should p r i m a r i l y be defined not 
f rom the outside but from w i t h i n , f rom the point of view 
of a w o m a n considering her o w n sexual orientation. So, 
for example, to say that a woman is heterosexual is to say 
that she experiences erotic attraction pr imar i ly (or per-
haps exclusively) to men. 
In m a k i n g that interpretation, however, it is important 
to avoid adopt ing an essentialist view of sexuality: i n this 
case, the view that what we feel is the key to w h o or what 
we really are. Sexuality is socially constructed, that is, it is 
" a social, not a biological phenomenon . " 1 7 
A l t h o u g h sexuality, like a l l h u m a n cultural activity, 
is grounded i n the body, the body's structure, physi-
ology, and funct ioning do not directly or s imply 
determine the configuration or meaning of sexual-
ity... T h e social construction of sexuality...encom-
pass[es] the very way sex is conceptualized, defined, 
labeled, and described f rom time to time and from 
culture to culture . 1 8 
W h i l e it must certainly be acknowledged that sexual 
attractions and erotic feelings often may be experienced as 
natural or inherent w i t h i n women, nevertheless, sexual 
desire and attraction are as much cultural artifacts as are 
gender roles. (This is a theme about w h i c h I shall say more 
i n the next section.) Hence, a l though erotic attraction is 
an important way of interpreting ascriptions of sexual 
orientation, erotic feelings should not be understood as 
being revelatory of what one really is. In general, the 
search for meanings for ascriptions of sexual orientation 
ought not to i m p l y a search for a " f i x e d sexual 'essence' or 
'nature' that lies buried beneath layers of social order-
i n g " 1 9 i n each of us. 
Erot ic attraction is an important part of the meaning of 
ascriptions of sexual orientation, but it cannot be the 
whole story for it fails to take account of the asymmetry of 
ascriptions of heterosexuality and lesbianism. As my ear-
lier remarks about the negative connotations of " lesbian" 
suggest, these ascriptions have different functions and 
effects, are predicated up on different assumptions, and 
involve different evaluations. Adrienne R i c h expresses it 
this way: " A n y theory or cul tural/pol i t ica l creation that 
treats lesbian existence as...the mirror image of either 
heterosexual or male homosexual relationsf] is profoundly 
weakened thereby, whatever its other contr ibut ions . " 2 0 
M a n y feminist theorists have attempted both to deal 
w i t h the asymmetry of these ascriptions and to develop the 
anti-essentialist view of sexuality by introducing the con-
cept of choice, part icularly i n connection w i t h lesbianism. 
T o identify another w o m a n or oneself as lesbian, then, is 
to refer to the m a k i n g of a deliberate choice. Such a choice 
is said to be not just " s e x u a l " but also " p o l i t i c a l . " 2 1 
A c c o r d i n g to this view, to refer to a w o m a n as a lesbian is 
not merely to describe the results of a personal decision or 
the manifestation of a cul tural phenomenon; i t is to de-
scribe " a committment to women as a po l i t i ca l group, 
w h i c h is the basis of a poli t ical/economic strategy leading 
to power for w o m e n . " 2 2 
T h e manifestation of this choice, it has been suggested, 
may even be independent of any actual physical contact; 
sexual orientation i n this interpretation is a matter of 
one's social behaviour or even one's worldview, not one's 
overt sexual practice. Accord ing to Blanche Wiesen Cook, 
for example, " W o m e n w h o love women, w h o choose 
women to nurture and support and to create a l i v i n g 
environment i n w h i c h to work creatively and independ-
ently, are lesbians," 2 3 even if they do not interact sexually 
w i t h women. Cook points out that a m a n and a w o m a n 
w h o love each other, look into each other's eyes, and are 
inseparable are regarded as heterosexual, even if they never 
" 'consummate[] ' their love i n the acceptable (or unaccep-
table) sexual m a n n e r . " 2 4 Hence, she says, two women who 
do l ikewise should also be considered to be lesbian. T h e 
ascription of sexual orientation is thus gradually divorced 
both f rom sexual behaviour and even f rom specific erotic 
attraction. Instead it becomes more literally a matter of 
orientation, that is, the focus of one's al ignment, bearings, 
and inc l inat ion i n life. 
T h i s view is endorsed by R i c h , w h o suggests that what 
she somewhat contemptuously calls "sexual lesbians" ( in 
other words, those w h o interact sexually w i t h women) 
may be male-identified, that is, a l l ied socially, pol i t ica l ly , 
and intellectually w i t h men, and therefore not lesbian i n 
the sense of f o r m i n g their pr imary relationships w i t h 
w o m e n . 2 5 Even if w o m e n such as these refuse to sleep, eat, 
or speak w i t h men, they may "s t i l l be psychically enthralled 
to maleness." 2 6 R i c h argues instead for a reformation of 
ascriptions of lesbianism: she introduces the concept of 
the " lesbian c o n t i n u u m , " that is, " a range—through each 
woman's life and throughout history—of woman-ident i -
f ied experience; not s imply the fact that a w o m a n has had 
or consciously desired genital sexual experience w i t h 
another w o m a n . " 2 7 In Rich ' s view, w o m e n w h o do not 
identify themselves as lesbian may nevertheless d u r i n g the 
course of their lives "mov[e] i n and out of this [lesbian] 
c o n t i n u u m . " 2 8 T o be a lesbian is to be a w o m a n w h o loves 
women, w h o refuses to comply w i t h the behaviour 
demanded of women, w h o refuses to define herself i n 
relation to m e n . 2 9 
By the same token, heterosexuality is not s imi lar ly 
regarded by these theorists as a choice; at least, it is sug-
gested, we cannot assume that it is. Instead Adrienne R i c h 
argues that it is the result of institutionalized coercion: 
" fF]or women heterosexuality may not be a 'preference' at 
a l l but something that has had to be imposed, managed, 
organized, propagandized, and maintained by force . " 3 0 
Here the more negative connotations of the term "orienta-
t i o n " seem relevant: to be heterosexual is then a matter of 
one's adjustment, adaptation, accommodation, habitua-
t ion and condi t ion ing i n life. 
H o w should this use of the concepts of choice and 
coercion be evaluated i n connection w i t h ascriptions of 
sexual orientation? Some critics have pointed out that the 
view that heterosexuality is compel led impl ies that it is 
not innate i n women; such a c l a i m is compatible w i t h the 
theory that sexuality is socially constructed. At the same 
time, however, some of Rich 's c laims seem to i m p l y that 
she believes that lesbianism is innate. She refers, for exam-
ple, to "the lesbian i n m e " and i n every w o m a n , the 
lesbian w h o is there even before one w h o l l y " k n o w s " that 
one is a lesbian. 3 1 T h u s R i c h sometimes appears to reverse 
the standard presupposit ion that i t is lesbianism, not heter-
osexuality, w h i c h calls out for a special explanation, by 
assuming that lesbianism is i n certain ways more natural . 
T h i s assumption is, surely, yet another version of sexual 
essential ism, 3 2 and it can be avoided only by emphasiz ing 
that a l though lesbianism and heterosexuality develop 
through quite different processes of acculturation, the 
lesbian c o n t i n u u m is a social phenomenon to w h i c h 
women are not born but i n w h i c h we learn, to a greater or 
lesser degree, to participate. 
A n n Ferguson argues that Rich ' s view conceives of les-
bian identity as "transhistorical p h e n o m e n o n , " when i n 
fact it should be seen as " a historical phenomenon, not 
appl icable to a l l societies and a l l periods of h i s t o r y . " 3 3 
Instead, according to Ferguson, an i n d i v i d u a l cannot be 
said to have a sexual identity or orientat ion wi thout the 
presence of a c o m m u n i t y of others w h o th ink of them-
selves as h a v i n g that ident i ty . 5 4 
T h i s c l a i m relies o n too literal an adherence to the 
concept of choice i n connection w i t h sexual orientation, 
an adherence w h i c h implaus ib ly distorts the meanings of 
the ascription of lesbianism. It generates a peculiar 
chicken-and-egg problem about the origins of sexual 
identif icat ion. What comes first: the self-identified lesbian 
or the lesbian community? C a n there be such a c o m m u n -
ity wi thout self-identified lesbians? It seems implaus ib le 
to say that before the eighteenth or nineteenth centuries, 
when self-conscious lesbian communit ies developed, les-
bians d i d not exist. Yet Ferguson's reliance o n the concept 
of an expl ic i t choice commits us to saying that, not so l o n g 
ago, there were no lesbians—and presumably no hetero-
sexuals, either. I suggest that the meanings of the term 
" l e s b i a n " and "heterosexual" w h i c h are necessary to the 
m a k i n g of such a c l a i m cease to be very useful, because 
they sever entirely the terms' connections w i t h erotic 
attraction. 
Ferguson also argues that, even i n contemporary terms, 
" i t is not meaningful to conjecture that someone is a 
lesbian w h o refuses to acknowledge herself as such. T a k -
i n g on a lesbian identity is a self-conscious commitment or 
d e c i s i o n . " 3 5 Consider the f o l l o w i n g case. A self-identified 
lesbian w o m a n once said, i n regard to her apparently 
heterosexual mother, "She's a real closet case herself." T h e 
w o m a n was suggesting that, a l though her mother had had 
no opportuni ty or encouragement to identify herself as a 
lesbian (and perhaps w o u l d even repudiate the label if 
presented w i t h it), nevertheless, the condit ions of her 
mother's life and her social interactions made it plausible 
to identify the mother as a (potential?) lesbian. I do not 
believe that that ascription is, as Ferguson's c l a i m implies , 
a meaningless one. Such an ascription does not lay c l a i m to 
revealing the woman's inner essence or "true identi ty" ; it 
is not m a k i n g a metaphysical dis t inct ion between appear-
ance and reality, but it does say something important 
about the woman's feelings and practices w h i c h is not at 
a l l captured by saying that she is heterosexual, or by 
saying, implaus ib ly , that she has no sexual orientation, or 
that categories of sexual orientation are just not applicable 
to her. In Rich 's terms, the w o m a n is part of the lesbian 
c o n t i n u u m . 
The concepts of the lesbian c o n t i n u u m and of c o m p u l -
sory heterosexuality enrich our interpretations of lesbian-
i s m and heterosexuality by acknowledging both the 
asymmetry of ascriptions of lesbianism and heterosexual-
ity and the social construction of sexuality. Nevertheless, 
whi le the m a k i n g of a self-conscious choice, particularly 
w i t h i n the context of a self-conscious community , may 
very wel l be a sufficient condit ion for identifying oneself 
or another w o m a n as lesbian. It is not, I suggest, a neces-
sary condi t ion . In the next section I shal l say more about 
the concept of choice, this time i n connection w i t h ascrip-
tions of heterosexuality. 
Ill 
So far I have suggested that to ascribe a sexual orienta-
t ion is not necessarily to refer to a person's behaviour or to 
the sex of her partners. Instead it is sometimes better 
understood as referring to erotic feelings, p r o v i d i n g that 
these are not taken to reveal the individual ' s sexual 
essence. It may also say something about indiv idua l choice 
and social compuls ion . I want to conclude my discussion 
by extending some of these ideas a little further. 
Heterosexuality and Choice 
C a n the concept of choice be l inked w i t h heterosexual 
orientation? 
Basically, heterosexuality means men first. That 's 
what it's a l l about. It assumes that every w o m a n is 
heterosexual; that every w o m a n is defined by and is 
the property of men. Her body, her services, her 
chi ldren belong to men. If you don't accept that 
def ini t ion, you're a queer—no matter who you sleep 
w i t h . . . 3 6 
T h i s statement might be criticized for impl i c i t ly ascrib-
i n g an unjustified privilege to lesbianism, and for assum-
i n g that to be heterosexual is to fa i l to live u p to feminist 
p r i n c i p l e s . 3 7 Indeed, f rom the point of view of some les-
bian feminists, "heterosexual feminists remain objects of 
suspicion, for their acceptance depends upon how com-
pletely they conceal or renounce heterosexual desire." 3 8 It 
is a mistake to summarily dismiss al l heterosexual women's 
experience by denying that some women may 
have actively chosen, rather than fallen into, a life of 
heterosexual marriage and children;. . .and that, i n 
their heterosexual relationships, they have control 
over their o w n sexuality and share equally i n the 
enjoyment of and part ic ipat ion i n their sexual 
relationships. 3 9 
I am not saying here only that some heterosexual 
women may lead exceptional lives i n the sense that their 
relationship wi th their m a n (or men) is experienced as 
egalitarian and uncoercive; I am saying that there is an 
important sense i n w h i c h a w o m a n can genuinely and 
sanely choose to be heterosexual, a l though the conditions 
and opportunities for that choice may be rare. Beyond the 
c l a i m that heterosexuality is innate (which seems to be a 
false essentialist claim) and the c la im that heterosexuality 
is coerced (which is probably true to at least some degree i n 
the majority of cases) there is a th ird possibi l i ty: that 
heterosexuality i s o r c a n be chosen, even—orespecially!— 
by feminists. 
In what cases, then, might it be correct to say that a 
w o m a n has genuinely chosen her heterosexuality? Char-
lotte Bunch's statement provides a crucial insight into the 
paradoxical answer to that question. For a heterosexual 
woman, to start to understand the inst i tut ion of hetero-
sexuality and the ideology of heterosexism is already to 
start to leave standard heterosexuality behind. For part of 
what is customarily meant by the ascription of heterosex-
uality is its unconscious "perfectly n a t u r a l " character. 
Anne W i l s o n Schaef claims that, i n general, women do 
not view the wor ld i n sexual terms. 
First, we do not categorize individuals and situa-
tions according to their sexuality. Second, we do not 
assume that each and every relationship must be 
sexual, nor do we view everything we do and every-
one we meet as hav ing some sexual significance. 
In fact, women do not define the w o r l d i n sexual 
terms. 4 0 
Sometimes, however, instead of being enlightened, this 
refusal or inabi l i ty to categorize i n sexual terms may be a 
form of blindness. M a r i l y n Frye has pointed out that in 
discussions of sexual prejudice and discr iminat ion one 
may often hear a statement such as "I don't think of myself 
as heterosexual," presumably said by a person w h o 
engages i n heterosexual act ivity. 4 1 O n the other hand, 
such persons often perceive lesbians (and gay men) as 
being unnecessarily preoccupied w i t h their sexuality, 
unable to stop ta lk ing about it and f launt ing it to the 
wor ld . 
Heterosexual critics of queers' " r o l e - p l a y i n g " ought 
to look at themselves i n the m i r r o r on their way out 
for a night on the town to see who's i n drag. The 
answer is, everybody is. Perhaps the m a i n difference 
between heterosexuals and queers is that when 
queers go forth i n drag, they k n o w they are engaged 
i n theatre—they are p l a y i n g and they k n o w they are 
p l a y i n g . Heterosexuals usually are taking it a l l per-
fectly seriously, t h i n k i n g they are i n the real w o r l d , 
t h i n k i n g they are the real w o r l d . 4 2 
T h e person whose sexual practice is heterosexual and 
w h o honestly and innocently states that she does not think 
of herself as heterosexual shows herself most clearly to be 
heterosexual i n the standard sense. Paradoxical ly , then, 
for a w o m a n to f i rmly and unambiguous ly a f f i rm her 
heterosexuality may already be to begin to leave it behind, 
that is, to cease to be heterosexual i n the u n t h i n k i n g 
unconscious way she once was. She ceases to participate 
wholeheartedly i n the heterosexual inst i tut ion. W h e n that 
sort of reflection takes place, I believe the woman can start to 
more genuinely choose her heterosexuality. She can explore 
her o w n personal history and determine how and when her 
sense of the erotic became separated from women and 
connected t o m e n . 1 5 She can, i n a way, begin to come out as 
heterosexual, not i n the heterosexist fashion that almost 
a l l heterosexuals, male and female, ordinar i ly mark their 
heterosexuality, but rather i n terms of an informed and 
self-aware feminist evaluation of her life as a heterosex-
u a l , 4 4 renouncing as far as possible the privilege accorded 
by heterosexuality, 4 5 and recognizing both the oppression 
lesbians undergo and the affinities she shares w i t h lesbian 
women. She thereby chooses to be heterosexual as a matter 
of sexual practice but not as a matter of the exclusive 
heterosexist a l ignment or orientation of her l ife. 
Lesbianism and Sexual Practice 
As far as the ascription of lesbianism is concerned, I 
want to suggest that it is a mistake to purge the term 
entirely of its connections w i t h actual sexual practice. 
Admit tedly , there appears to have been a good pol i t i ca l 
basis for the separation of lesbian sexual orientation f rom 
purely sexual practice. 
T h e o l d lesbian communi ty was defined by a sexual 
difference. Lesbians were stereotyped as only sexual. 
It is understandable that many lesbians have reacted 
by counter-defining lesbianism as a pol i t i ca l con-
v i c t i o n . 4 6 
In addit ion, as R i c h has pointed out, c o n f i n i n g the term 
lesbian to strictly genital activities independent of female 
friendship has the effect of l i m i t i n g the erotic itself. In 
female terms, she suggests, the erotic is not confined to any 
single part of the body or even solely to the body itself; it is 
a diffuse and omnipresent energy. 4 7 
Nevertheless, there are good reasons to insist upon the 
necessity of i n c l u d i n g sexual practice w i t h i n the meaning 
of lesbianism. T h e reason can be found partly i n the words 
of one w o m a n quoted by R i c h , w h o stated that if "the 
lesbian i n u s " was to become a figurative term—that is, 
detached f rom its connect ion w i t h sexual activity w i t h 
women—then "she, as a w o m a n w h o had been oppressed 
for physical ly expressing her love for women, wanted 
another name for w h o she w a s . " 4 8 Feminists can retain the 
richness i n the concept forged by its connections w i th "the 
self-chosen w o m a n , the forbidden 'pr imary intensity' 
between women, and also the w o m a n w h o refuses to obey, 
w h o has said 'no ' to the fathers . " 4 9 We should also retain 
the connection w i t h a forbidden, suppressed activity, w i t h 
sexual practice that has i n the past and the present sub-
jected w o m e n to persecution and oppression for their 
"deviance." 
There is another reason. As Amber H o l l i b a u g h and 
Cherrie Moraga argue, 
whi le lesbianism is certainly accepted in feminism, 
it's more as a p o l i t i c a l or intel lectual concept. It 
seems feminism is the last rock of conservatism. It 
w i l l not be sexualized. It's prudish i n that way. . . 5 0 
Feminists ought not to fear, or appear to fear, sexual 
ac t iv i ty , 5 1 or be int imidated by the assumption that the 
presence of, or references to, explic i t sexual activity w i l l 
somehow detract f rom, or discredit, feminist practice and 
theory. Women's sexuality is something that feminists 
should proudly af f i rm and proc la im. T h u s , wi th A n n 
Ferguson, I believe that 
the possibil i ty of a sexual relationship between 
women is an important challenge to patriarchy 
because it acts as an alternative to the patriarchal 
heterosexual couple, thus chal lenging the hetero-
sexual ideology that w o m e n are dependent on men 
for romantic/sexual love and satisfaction. There-
fore, any def ini t ional strategy w h i c h seeks to drop 
the sexual component of " l e s b i a n " i n favor of an 
emotional commitment to, or preference for, women 
tends to lead feminists to downplay the historical 
importance of the movement for sexual l iberat ion . 5 2 
Bisexuality and Binocular Vision 
I want to conclude w i t h some remarks about ascriptions 
of that anomalous sexual orientation, bisexuality. I have 
said n o t h i n g about it so far i n this paper, and that absence 
fu l ly reflects its absence from most recent feminist discus-
sions of sexuality. In fact, to judge f rom the feminist 
debates, the category "b i sexua l " may be an empty set; it is 
n o wonder that self-identified bisexual women at the 
C o m i n g Together Conference wondered seriously whether 
they actually exist. 
Adrienne R i c h speaks scornfully of the "frequently 
heard assertion that i n a wor ld of genuine equality, where 
men were nonoppressive and nurtur ing, everyone w o u l d 
be b isexual . " Accord ing to R i c h such a c la im blurs the 
realities of women's sexual struggles; " i t is the o l d l iberal 
leap across the tasks and struggles of here and n o w . " 5 3 T h e 
chief difficulty w i t h the gl ib c la im that we are a l l really 
bisexual is just that it runs into the problem of sexual 
essentialism. Even A n n Ferguson, w h o relies very heavily 
o n a belief i n the social construction of sexuality, seems to 
fa l l v ic t im to this view of bisexuality. "[I]f," she says, "a 
gir l ' s o r i g i n a l love for her mother is itself due to the social 
fact that women, and not men, mother, then neither lesbi-
anism nor heterosexuality can be said to be women's natu-
ral (uncoerced) sexual preference." 5 4 She then refers 
approvingly to the hypothesis that "humans are basically 
bisexual or transsexual [whatever that means i n this con-
text] at b i r t h . " 
T h i s assumes that enforced heterosexuality or acquired 
lesbianism somehow masks and represses our supposedly 
inherent bisexuality. However, " b i s e x u a l " is no more 
what we really are than is "heterosexual" or " l e s b i a n . " 5 5 
T h e only useful interpretation of the c l a i m that we are a l l 
really bisexual is just that we a l l have the physical capacity 
for sexual interactions w i t h members of both sexes. N o 
one w o u l d dispute that, for the reason that it is not a very 
interesting or controversial c l a i m ; and it certainly tells us 
n o t h i n g whatsoever about a person's real or natural sexual 
orientation. 
In feminist discussions, ascriptions of bisexuality, unl ike 
ascriptions of lesbianism, are seldom seen as hav ing any 
actual or potential social, pol i t ica l , or intellectual s ignif i -
cance of a positive sort. For example, Joan Nestle criticizes 
scientists w h o categorize as bisexual what she calls the 
" fem lesbian." According to Nestle, such a categorization 
strips such a person of a l l power and makes her into a 
fool ish w o m a n w h o can easily be beckoned over into the 
right c a m p . 5 6 Nestle is apparently w i l l i n g , then, to inter-
pret the ascription of bisexuality as connot ing a moral and 
intellectual failure. A n n Ferguson goes even farther. In 
cr i t ic iz ing the ordinary definit ion of lesbian as "a w o m a n 
w h o has sexual attractions toward and relationships w i t h 
other w o m e n , " she complains that this meaning does not 
exclude practicing bisexual women. 
M a n y women w h o have loved men and had sexual 
relationships w i t h them come later to have sexual 
relationships wi th women and to think of them-
selves as lesbians without bothering to consider the 
metaphysical significance of the distinction between 
being a bisexual w h o loves a w o m a n and a lesbian 
w h o loves a w o m a n . 5 7 
Apparent ly some sort of transcendental barrier separ-
ates bisexual women from the lofty reaches of true lesbian-
i s m . What these remarks clearly show is that i n some 
feminist circles, at least, bisexual is almost as much a 
pejorative term as is lesbian in nonfeminist circles. Behind 
this language lie certain assumptions about the moral and 
intellectual inferiority of bisexual women. Self-identified 
bisexual women are found gui l ty of leading inauthentic 
lives. 
M a r i l y n Frye quotes Sarah H o a g l a n d as suggesting that 
because there is no category of woman-identi f ied-woman 
i n the conceptual schemes of phallocracies, a lesbian is " i n 
the interesting and peculiar posit ion of being something 
that doesn't ex i s t . " 5 8 T h e bisexual woman, I contend, is i n 
a somewhat comparable posit ion. Contrary to appear-
ances, an ascription of bisexuality involves a sort of double 
negative, for it can be used, both by bisexual women 
themselves and by others, as a way of denying both hetero-
sexuality and lesbianism. A woman w h o identifies herself 
as bisexual is disavowing wholehearted commitment to 
the inst i tut ion of heterosexuality, but she also fails to be a 
" t r u e " lesbian since she is not exclusively committed to 
women. Hence the self-identified bisexual w o m a n appears 
to be declaring her independence from social control both 
by heterosexism and by the lesbian communi ty . She seems 
to be trying to elude both sets of rules. A l t h o u g h she 
cannot entirely escape social prescriptions for sexual 
behaviour, she has (at least so far) no very established 
community w i t h i n which to define herself and be defined. 5 9 
She may be seen by heterosexuals as just experimenting; 
she may be viewed by lesbians as too fearful to come out. In 
these reactions we see a tendency w h i c h is just the opposite 
of that exemplif ied in the c la im that we are a l l really 
bisexual; i n this context, what is claimed is that no one is 
really bisexual, that i n fact there are no real bisexuals. 
There is another possible interpretation of the ascrip-
t ion of bisexuality; its positive implicat ions have been 
overlooked and denied. Tradi t iona l ly those w h o are sexu-
ally deviant have been deprived of access to power. H o w -
ever, this deviance, the t u r n i n g aside from the established 
path, can be a potential source of insight as wel l . Accord-
i n g to M a r i l y n Frye, to ascribe sexual orientation is to 
describe the individual 's orientation of attention. 
T h e event of becoming a lesbian is a reorientation of 
attention i n a k i n d of ontological conversion. 6 0 It is a 
peculiar blessing both of gay men and of lesbians 
that i n many ways we are both Cit izen and Exi le , 
member of the fami ly and stranger. Most of us were 
raised straight; many have been straight, and many 
of us can and do pass as straight m u c h of the time. 
Most of us know that straight w o r l d from the inside 
and, if we only w i l l , f rom its outer edge. We can look 
at it w i t h the accuracy and depth provided by binoc-
ular v i s i o n . 6 1 
That binocular vision is also attainable, surely, by a 
bisexual woman. I think that the w o m a n w h o I mentioned 
at the beginning of this paper, w h o identifies herself as a 
lesbian bisexual, is deliberately acknowledging her o w n 
binocular vis ion. She is not necessarily an i n d i v i d u a l w h o 
is callously attempting to have the best and avoid the worst 
of both worlds; she may instead be a person whose expe-
rience can generate important insights for feminist theory 
and practice. T h i s suggestion is not, of course, a c la im for 
some sort of implausible epistemic privilege for bisexual 
women; it is s imply a suggestion that feminists recognize 
the value and legitimacy of these women's experiences. 
Indeed, that binocular v is ion to w h i c h M a r i l y n Frye refers 
s h o u l d be treasured and nurtured wherever it is f o u n d — 
whether i n lesbians or i n bisexual women or even i n 
heterosexual women w h o have recognized, evaluated, and 
reasserted their o w n heterosexuality—for it expands our 
understanding of what it is for women to be sexual. We 
should appreciate the honesty of feminists l ike Mar iana 
Valverde, w h o now identifies herself as a lesbian but refers 
without regret to what she calls her heterosexual past: "I 
used to l ike men quite a lot, and a m not completely 
i m m u n e to their charms even n o w . " 6 2 A l t h o u g h there are 
undeniably some significant and serious ethical problems 
connected w i t h women's sexual practices, pleasure and 
love shared by h u m a n beings ought not to be condemned a 
priori. 
As I said at the beginning, i n this paper I want to avoid 
premature closure o n the subject of ascribing sexual orien-
tations. So this paper has no very definitive conclusion but 
only some closing thoughts. I do not want to fa l l v ic t im 
here to a pol lyanna- ish vis ion of female sexuality, and I 
also do not want to trivialize the st igma a n d oppression 
w h i c h lesbian women i n particular have experienced. T h e 
risks and dangers, joys and discoveries of c o m i n g out as a 
lesbian cannot be underestimated. 6 3 I wish , nevertheless, 
to suggest that there are important ways i n w h i c h bisexual 
and even heterosexual w o m e n can also come out, at least 
w i t h i n the context of a supportive and tolerant feminist 
community . A woman w h o identifies herself self-con-
sciously (in the best sense of "self-conscious") as lesbian, 
bisexual, or heterosexual, is saying something crucial 
about herself. For a w o m a n to ascribe to herself w i t h f u l l 
awareness a part icular sexual orientation is to continue 
the process of creating, rather than merely discovering, her 
sexuality. Instead of engaging i n the sort of mutua l name-
c a l l i n g and denigrat ion w h i c h has characterized some 
recent discussions of sexual orientat ion, feminists should 
be promot ing and celebrating the type of self-transcendence 
involved i n recognizing the many forms of women's 
sexuality. 
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her search 
She took art lessons 
year by year 
m a k i n g her way across myriad canvases 
and some were faces 
meticulous tracings of 
life's i m p r i n t o n h u m a n flesh: 
she struggled to crawl 
beneath the lines and shadows 
slither w i t h i n the crevices 
ride the undulat ions 
i n hopes of f i n d i n g meaning 
somewhere a m o n g the glit tering eyes 
set jaws—her husband's weariness 
and vexation there o n his 
roadmap pastel face of h i g h forehead 
receding hair l ine. H o w many dishes he 
washed and cleaning ladies he fired 
no one knows. 
Day after day she 
painted to get i n touch and failed 
if not faces then 
flowers quiet forgiving 
photographic 
l u m i n o u s and inert 
totally without personal 
i m p r i n t , w i l l or raging heart. 
T h e n , her masterpiece: 
there the l i v i n g room 
scene w i t h seated sheep dog 
gazing out the picture 
w i n d o w as the giant pine trees 
shoulder away implacable pale yel low 
neighboring houses 
her l o n g i n g to connect 
as palpable as 
present as the clear glass 
through w h i c h the dog 
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